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International Remedies
Lea Brilmayert
It could easily be argued that the most important topic in international
law is the law of remedies. The subject includes both the sanctions that
are imposed following a breach of international substantive norms, and
the system of institutions designed to investigate violations and then im-
pose those sanctions. The fact that norms governing international con-
duct lack a secure centralized enforcement mechanism leaves the
international system vulnerable to the accusation that international law
is not really "law" at all. For this reason, scholars of the subject have
addressed with great seriousness the question of whether an adequate
system of sanctions, formal or informal, exists. I
The new Restatement's contributions to the subject are therefore par-
ticularly welcome. The prior Restatement did not have a chapter dedi-
cated specifically to remedies, although (as in the present Restatement)
there were references to remedial issues scattered throughout the sub-
stantive discussion.2 In adding a chapter devoted specifically to reme-
dies, the new Restatement focuses upon this important subject the
attention that it needs and deserves. The Restatement's treatment of
remedies, however, by its very nature cannot be inclusive enough. While
apparently broad-minded and all-encompassing, on closer examination,
it appears to be heavily slanted towards a narrow legalistic view that
would undercut the claim that substantive norms of international con-
duct are adequately supported by legal enforcement mechanisms. The
more narrowly the Restatement's remedies provisions are drawn, the less
convincing are the claims that an adequate system of remedies exists, and
that the substantive norms are "legal." Because a system of substantive
norms requires adequate remedies to be effective, the very motivation
behind the inclusion of a section on remedies requires a more expansive
discussion.
tNathan Baker Professor, Yale Law School. J.D. 1976, Boalt Hall School of Law,
LL.M. 1978, Columbia Law School.
1. See L. HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE (2d ed. 1979), especially pages 1-27 dealing
with the distinctive nature of a decentralized system (and whether the system is really a legal
one), and pages 49-68 entitled "Why Do Nations Observe Law?". See also O. SCHACTER,
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 26-32 (1982).
2. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES §§ 806(3), 807(1) (1965) (remedies for violations of GATT obligations).
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I. Remedies in Domestic and International Law Contrasted
The motivation for discussing remedies is rather different in interna-
tionallaw than in domestic law. Of course, the topic of remedies is im-
portant in both contexts. "Sanctions and enforcement, at all levels of
organization, are appropriate legal questions because they represent the
crucible oflaw, the test of its reality."3 Under one commonly held view,
proof of the existence of adequate remedies is v~rtually a condition prece-
dent to a convincing cJaim that substantive norms of international con-
duct should be taken seriously. In the international context the existence
of adequate remedies is more in doubt, and this feeds suspicion that inter-
national law is not really a developed legal system. In this respect, a
theory of international remedies is as important to international law as a
theory ofjudicial review is to domestic constitutional law. Certainly it is
possible to study constitutiomil doctrine without reference to Marbury v.
Madison 4 or the literature that it has engendered. It is equally possible to
study international substantive norms separately from a discussion of the
distinctive jurisprudential issues that arise in a world of decentralized
authority. In both instances, however, doing so cuts one off from central
foundational issues that both motivate and permeate doctrinal develop-
ment at key points. The international law of remedies is more analogous
to such central jurisprudential issues as judicial review than to the do-
mestic law of remedies, which in comparison to both is far less
controversial.
Once one has recognized that the motivation for studying remedies in
the international context is somewhat different than the motivation for
studying domestic remedies, one should not be surprised to see that the
Restatement's treatment is strikingly different from what domestic law-
yers would expect to find in a chapter entitled "Remedies." It is neces-
sary only to contrast the table of contents of the Remedies chapter in the
Restatement to the table of contents of the remedies portions of the Uni-
form Commercial Code, for example, to see how great the differences
are.5 The usual general domestic discussions of remedie~,address the
3. Reisman, Sanctions and En/orcement, in THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL ORDER: CONFLICT MANAGEMENT 276 (1971).
4. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
5. The Uniform Commercial Code sections on remedies differentiate sellers' and buyers'
remedies. See, e.g., UNIF. COMMERICIAL CODE § 2-508 (cure by seller of improper tender or
delivery; replacement), § 2-601 (buyers' rights on improper delivery), § 2-703 (sellers' remedies
in general), § 2-706 (sellers' resale including contract for resale), § 2-711 (buyers' remedies in
general; buyers' security interest in rejected goods), § 2-709 (action for the price), § 2·712
("cover," buyers' procurement of substitute goods), § 2-715 (buyers' incidental and conse·
quential damages).
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types of remedies available: specific performance, money damages, in-
junctions, and the like. This is not to say that such topics are never men-
tioned in the Restatement. They are, if only briefly.6 However, the bulk
of the discussion in the Restatement concerns something else: namely,
the proper institutional structures to which remedial arguments should
be addressed. Is jurisdiction available in the International Court of Jus-
tice? Can a nation exercise self-help? Is arbitration appropriate?
In domestic law, we relegate such questions of institutional compe-
tence to a different group of scholars than the ones who specialize in
remedies. By' and large, institutional questions are studied and taught by
specialists in civil procedure, federal courts, or alternative dispute resolu-
tion. Thus, the question of what remedy should be applied is differenti-
ated from the question of which remedial institution ought to apply it.
There is no such division of labor in international law: institutional is-
sues are at the core of the remedy problem. This difference should not be
surprising, because in the international- context adequate solutions to
these institutional questions cannot be taken for granted to th~ same de-
gree as in the domestic context. Similarly, international lawyers caimot
afford to separate the question of the existence of institutions to remedy
violations from the question of what remedies those institutions are actu-
ally able to apply. The very existence of adequate authoritative mecha-
nisms is in doubt. International legal .theorists must, therefore,
consistently address and rebut the skeptics" suspicions that international
norms rest on foundations no more secure than the international legal
scholars' ipse dixit ~ The Restatement's remedies sections cannot avoid
addressing the availability of institutional mechanisms to a much greater
~egree than is necessary in a domestic discussion of the subject.
While the need to demonstrate adequate remedial institutions in the
international context is therefore clear, what is less obvious is the tension
that this causes within the Restateme1;Zt's general enterprise. Some inter-
national remedies result from formal legal processes, such as adjudica-
tion and arbitration, that would be reasonably familiar to domestic
lawyers. Others have a larger political component, such as the applica-
tion of diplomatic pressure: these types of remedies are not legalistic in
the narrow sense. It seems undeniable as a practical matter that such
legal/political mechanisms are crucial to maximizing respect for interna-
tional norms and are therefore· central to the claim that international
norms should be taken seriously. If the Restatement dealt only with for-
6. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 901 comments d and e (1987) (discussions of reparations) [hereinafter RESTATE-
MENT (THIRD)].
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mal legal mechanisms for remedying international violations, then it
would seriously understate the importance of international substantive
norms both to scholars and to the party seeking a remedy. An overly
legalistic view of remedies for this reason undermines the substantive
norms that are set out with such care in other parts of the Restatement.
If, on the other hand, the Restatement attempts to be complete in its
treatment of international remedies and seeks to go beyond legalistic
mechanisms, it has a different problem. This problem centers on the core
issue of using the Restatement as a vehicle to address broader issues on
the margin between international law and politics. It is not clear how
well suited a restatement is for delineating a broader range of legal/polit-
ical remedies.
As we will see below, the Restatement currently discusses the sorts of
remedies that are well captured by its black letter legal rules; it does not
attempt to describe remedies that might be thought more political. By
maintaining a clear separation of law and politics-by taking a narrow
view of the former and disregarding the latter-the Restatement elimi-
nates political/legal remedies from its consideration. The effect is to un-
dercut the efficacy of its norms and thus the argument that international
law is law like any other. It is arguably neither possible nor appropriate
to reduce the subject of international remedies to a set of narrow legal
rules, as the Restatement apparently attempts to do. Such a reduction to
legalistic rules is impossible because a broader range of sanctions for in-
ternational violations is essential to pressure outlaw states to terminate
violations; it is undesirable because there is no reason to suppose that all
responses should be reducible to narrow legalistic ones.
My claim is as follows. To have convincing substantive legal norms,
one would like to be able to demonstrate the existence of effective reme-
dies. A narrow definition of what constitutes a remedy leaves substantive
wrongs without a remedy. By choosing not to address the variety of
remedies that have political as well as legal overtones, the Restatement
takes a narrow view of what remedies are available. However, an insis-
tence that remedies take a legalistic form underestimates the efficacy of
international enforcement. Restricting remedies to those that are purely
legal undercuts the claim that the Restatement's substantive norms are
indeed legal, because if the narrow view of what counts as a remedy is
correct, then there are no sanctions for many substantive violations. One
is then left with supposed legal rights without effective remedies, a result
that is jurisprudentially troubling. To demonstrate this claim requires
taking a closer look at the variety of remedies that are recognized in the
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Restatement and those that exist in the world of international law and
relations.
II. The Variety of International Remedies
A wide variety of institutional responses to a perceived violation of
international law might be swept under the general heading of remedies.
At least five different types of situations come to mind as involving· reme-
dial issues. I list them here in increasing order of coerciveness and legal
formality: voluntary remedial responses, political pressure, negotiation,
self-help, and international adjudication.
The least coercive and formal of these remedies are the actions that
one state takes voluntarily to correct its own breaches of its international
obligations. In section 901, the Restatement provides that a state must
terminate any continuing violation, and (ordinarily) make reparations.?
It need not admit guilt, although it may do so, or it may make a formal
apology.8 The institution to which remedial arguments are addressed in
this situation is the violating state itself, which may respond either out of
respect for the principle or from domestic political pressure. It is hard to
deny that domestic political measures are one means of encouraging at
least rough compliance with norms of internationallaw.9 To the extent
that states live up to international law at all, it is in some degree because
of such domestic political constraints.
Hand in hand with spontaneous remedial actions by the violator is
remedial action taken as a result of political pressure by the victim state
or by third parties. This second category does not refer to efforts by
third party decisionmakers, but rather to informal political pressure by
other concerned states aiming to force the offending nation to cease the
objectionable conduct and/or make reparations. While political protests
by the victim and by third parties may be channelled through institu-
tional structures such as the United Nations, they need not be. Protests
can also be conveyed through traditional diplomacy or informal commu-
nication. They can be public or secret, from allies of the violator or allies
of the victim. This second category, as does the first, includes the actions
of the violating state's political institutions as an element of the enforce-
ment process, but here the actions are taken in response to pressures re-
sulting from the political activities of other nations.
7. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 901.
8. Id. § 902 comment h (ex gratia relief), § 901 comment d (apology).
9. See L. HENKIN, supra note I, at 60-68.
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Of course voluntary compliance and political pressure are not always
enough. A third possibility, therefore, is negotiation. Negotiation may
enable the victim state and the violator state to successfully settle a prob-
lem that has persisted in the face of diplomatic pressures. The possible
results include a promise to discontinue violations, an apology, or per-
haps monetary compensation. Negotiations may be facilitated by third
parties who offer to mediate. This institutional response is similar to our
second alternative of political pressure, but is somewhat more
formalized.
Fourth, the victim may choose self-help. Self-help may include break-
ing off diplomatic relations or suspension of reciprocal treaty rights, and
is generally defensible as long as the response is not out of proportion to
the injury suffered and the response does not violate rules against the use
or threat of force. 10 This institutional mechanism is basically a physical
response directed against the state violating the international norm.
The final institutional remedy, which most resembles what we in the
domestic arena would characterize as truly remedial, is authoritative
third party adjudication. A variety of third party mechanisms are poten-
tially available. The first possibility that comes to mind is the Interna-
tional Court of Justice-the apparent analog to domestic adjudication-
but there are other possibilities, such as arbitration or instituting litiga-
tion in the domestic courts of one of the involved states.
III. The Structure of the Remedies Sections
The structure of the Remedies chapter of the Restatement seems at
first glance to reflect this variety of formal and informal remedies,
although, as we see below, this appearance of broad-mindedness is some-
what misleading. Section 901 states generally that a violating state has
an obligation to terminate the violation and make reparations. Section
902 provides that states may make claims against one another either
through diplomatic channels or through any other procedure on which
the parties have agreed. Section 903 deals with the International Court
of Justice, outlining the circumstances in which it may exercise jurisdic-
tion. Section 904 discusses arbitration, while section 905 discusses uni-
lateral (self-help) remedies. Sections 906 and 907 address private
remedies generally, and in U. S. domestic courts specifically. The organi-
zation of the Remedies chapter thus reflects the different institutional
structures that participate in the international sanctioning process.
10. See O. SCHACTER, supra note 1, at 167-87.
584
HeinOnline -- 14 Yale J. Int’l L. 585 1989
Restatement: International Remedies
What difference does it make that there is such a wide range of possi-
ble remedial institutions in the international setting? One answer is that
what the victim gets, as a remedy, may depend upon which institutional
avenue is pursued. The question of what remedy to grant is differently
phrased in different contexts. In the context of voluntary compliance the
remedial question would be: What should the violating state do when
and if it recognizes that it has committed a violation of international law?
In the context of political protests lodged against the violator, one might
instead ask: What corrections are other states entitled to demand when
rights have been violated? Regarding negotiation, one asks: What
would be a reasonable negotiated settlement as between the parties for
this violation of international law? When the issue is self-help, one
would ask: What unilateral measures is a state entitled to impose in re-
sponse to a violation of its rights ~nder international law? Finally, in the
context of third party resolution, one has the classic remedial question of
domestic law: What should the third party decisionmaker impose as a
remedy once a violation has been found?
Separating these questions in this way, it is clear that pursuing reme-
dies through different institutional avenues has very different conse-
quences. In less formal remedial contexts, the question of the
appropriate remedy is much less sharply posed than when a remedial
action is considered by a third party adjudicator. For instance, the rem-
edy named by a domestic court addressing international law issues, or by
the International Court of Justice adjudicating an international dispute,
might very well be influenced by the sense that moderation is required in
matters of important state interests. This is not to say, of course, that the
violator would be limited to a moderate remedy if it felt moved to offer
voluntary reparations, or that the victim state should not demand a great
deal more in the course of lodging political protests against the violator.
Nor is this to say that the remedy that the parties would ideally reach
through negotiation or diplomacy would be the same as the remedy sug-
gested by a third-party decisionmaker. Certainly there is no reason to
believe that a third-party remedy would necessarily resemble a self-help
remedy that was permitted under international law. There are con-
straints on formal decisionmaking processes that do not apply to infor-
mal dispute resolution or to political give and take.
The question of "who imposes the remedy?" is of great significance to
the question of which remedial outcome ought to or will be imposed.
The remedial outcome may depend substantially upon the remedial pro-
cess that is utilized. In particular, it is not at all clear whether the more
political mechanisms for dispute resolution, such as the lodging of diplo-
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matic protests with the violator state directly, ought to be regulated by
rules about what is "appropriate" to request or what procedures should
be employed to make or communicate demands. This raises the question
of whether the rules which are set out by the Restatement for pursuing
formal remedial procedures, such as World Court adjudication, are in-
tended to apply also to informal mechanisms, such as diplomatic
demands.
Presumably not, although at times this is not completely clear. The
Restatement's ambivalence towards informal remedial procedures can be
illustrated by its discussion of standing. In the text of section 902, we
find that "fa] state may bring a claim against another state"ll for a viola-
tion of international obligation. Comment a, entitled "Standing to make
claims," reiterates the general principle that "[o]rdinarily, claims ...
may be made only by the state to whom the obligation was owed."!2
There are limited exceptions, since some international obligations are
owed to all states; the comment cites examples of harm to the environ-
ment!3 and to international human rights.!4 Other violations are en-
forceable by private persons under sections 906 and 907. But by and
large remedies seem limited by standing requirements. Reporters' note 1
of section 902, for instance, cites authority concerning which states have
the right to take legal action.!S Section 905 speaks of the right of the
victim to take unilateral measures.!6 The general introduction to the
remedies chapter states that only the victim state has standing to make a
formal claim or to resort to third party settlement procedures, aside from
obligations erga omnes. 17
Yet one wonders whether such standing limitations are really designed
to apply to all sorts of remedies. One could adduce evidence that they
are not; the references to "legal action," "formal claims" and "third
party settlement procedures" in the provisions just cited suggest that the
standing requirement is limited to such relatively formal remedial re-
sponses. It therefore seems likely that under the Restatement, the usual
standing rule applies only to some remedial mechanisms and not to
others. The ripeness and exhaustion requirements seem similarly lim-
11. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 902 (emphasis supplied).
12. [d. § 902 comment a (emphasis supplied).
13. [d. §§ 602, 703(2).
14. [d. § 703(2).
15. [d. § 902 reporters' note 1, citing Ethiopia and Liberia v. South Africa [1966] I.e.J. 6,
47.
16. [d. § 905.
17. [d. pt. IX, introductory note.
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ited. 18 But what precisely are "legal" claims, "formal" claims, claims
before "third party settlement procedures"? The provisions cited abo.ve
do not seem entirely consistent in this regard. Common sense provides a
rough answer. Technical requirements such as standing do not apply to
informal remedies in the same way that they apply to formalized, legalis-
tic remedies. Although the Restatement's language is unclear on this
point, it does not make sense to apply standing requirements equally to
all remedial efforts.
Consider as examples the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan or the
Iranian threats against Salman Rushdie. The right of other nations to
lodge diplomatic protests against such actions does not depend upon
whether the claimed violation is technically an obligation erga omnes.
Effective enforcement of international law depends upon the involvement
of a greater range of states than just the state which is formally the vic-
tim. Expanding the category of obligations erga omnes is no solution,
because that would enlarge the rights of third parties to initiate formal
dispute resolution procedures, such as initiating cases before the Interna-
tional Court of Justice. Instead, the appropriate response is to recognize
that there is a broad range of remedies for legal violations, and that tech-
nical legal rules for formal legal remedies do not automatically apply to
all of these remedies. This is particularly clear in the least formal and
coercive remedial context, namely, domestic political pressure or infor-
mal diplomatic pressures by allies.
By using terms such as "claim" in the text of section 902, the Restate-
ment sidesteps the issue of which measures are subject to its standing
rule. If "claim" were read broadly to encompass all protests, then com-
ment a on "standing to make claims" is patently false as a descriptive
matter, and even more patently undesirable as a normative matter. Of
course, the better reading would be that secti~n 902 was not designed to
apply a standing requirement to all remedial action, informal as well as
formal.
One suspects that portions of the analysis of remedies found in the
Restatement were implicitly designed to deal with the types of formal
decisionmaking institutions with which lawyers feel most comfortable,
such as arbitration and adjudication. Self-help is also reasonably suscep-
tible to characterization in fairly narrow legal terms, and is a topic on
which the Restatement also supplies rules. Remedies that fall more to-
wards the political end of the legal/political spectrum, however, do not
18. Id. § 902 comment b (ripeness) (referring to "formal claims" in contrast to "informal
protests"), comment k (exhaustion) (referring to "formal claims").
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lend themselves well to legal rules about the appropriate steps to take. It
is difficult, if not impossible, to lay down rules on who can lodge diplo-
matic protests and what the contents of such protests might include. On
such questions, it is not clear that any specific "law" of remedies exists,
except, perhaps, for rather vague exhortations that a state ought to vol-
untarily observe its obligations, cure any breaches, and respond to rea-
sonable political pressure to observe international obligations.
It is therefore understandable that the Restatement does not accom-
modate such remedial possibilities. Although its remedial provisions at
first appear all-encompassing, it is not clear where such legal/political
remedies might fit within the Restatement's scheme. For reasons already
mentioned, they do not fit well within the provision in section 902 that
states make "claims" against one another. Section 902 by its own terms
deals only with obligations "owed to the claimant state or to states gener-
ally." The introductory note to Part IX recognizes that "in many in-
stances, states prefer to settle disputes in a political forum," but its cross-
references demonstrate clearly that this allusion includes only political
responses by the victim. 19 The more closely one reads the discussion of
remedies, the more clearly it appears that political pressure by the world
community, or by domestic constituencies, is simply not intended to be
included. Indeed, the general introductory remarks to the Restatement
suggest that for analytical purposes the posture that is adopted is that of
a hypothetical world tribunal.20 If this focus is carried over into its reme-
dies provisions it becomes clear why the remedial provisions are so nar-
rowly drawn.
This observation returns us to our starting point-·the reason that the
subject of remedies is so central to international law. Remedies is an
important topic to the Restatement in the same way that all of the other
sections are important-as part of the ordinary fabric of international
law. Remedies are important, however, for foundational reasons as well.
The case for the importance of international substantive norms is
strengthened considerably by demonstrating the existence of an adequate
mechanism for correcting substantive violations. To disregard an impor-
tant source of international remedies-informal diplomatic and political
pressure, both domestic and from the world community-is to undercut
the relevance of the remainder of the Restatement. It forces upon us a
difficult and controversial jurisprudential issue: whether the existence of
19. The cross-references are to § 902, comment d and reporters' note 5 which deal with
"direct negotiations between the parties" and "[d]ispute settlement in or by international orga-
nizations," respectively.
20. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) introduction.
588
HeinOnline -- 14 Yale J. Int’l L. 589 1989
Restatement: International Remedies
substantive legal norms depends upon a showing of adequate legal en-
forcement mechanisms. More importantly, it denies what may be, prac-
tically speaking, the most significant remedy of all. Nations are
constrained by domestic and world politics more than by their fear of an
arbitration or a World Court judgment.
In the longstanding debate over whether international norms are "re-
ally law," even the most ardent supporters of the legal characterization
would surely balk at asserting that international remedies can be reduced
to narrowly legalistic terms as well. As Louis Henkin notes,
[n]ations today promote their interests principally by ad hoc negotiation,
influence, compromise, and political accommodation. Relations between
nations are primarily the responsibility neither of generals nor of judges;
they remain the domain of diplomacy between representatives of nations
promoting national policies.21
The normative force of international law rests on more than formal
dispute resolution processes, yet by and large, the Restatement chooses
not to address the larger remedial possibilities. If the reason is that these
remedial possibilities are deemed political and therefore not within the
scope of a Restatement of Law, then the most important foundations of
the subject are thereby excluded. In terms of its own substantive aspira-
tions, the Restatement ofForeign Relations Law must recognize that any
narrow legalistic analysis of international remedies is necessarily
incomplete.
21. L. HENKIN, supra note I, at 2.
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